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Abstract. High-rate flooding attacks (aka Distributed Denial of Service or 
DDoS attacks) continue to constitute a pernicious threat within the Internet 
domain.  In this work we demonstrate how using packet source IP addresses 
coupled with a change-point analysis of the rate of arrival of new IP addresses 
may be sufficient to detect the onset of a high-rate flooding attack. Importantly, 
minimizing the number of features to be examined, directly addresses the issue 
of scalability of the detection process to higher network speeds. Using a proof 
of concept implementation we have shown how pre-onset IP addresses can be 
efficiently represented using a bit vector and used to modify a “white list” filter 
in a firewall as part of the mitigation strategy. 
Keywords: IP addresses, bit vector, bloom filter, cumulative sum. 
1. Introduction 
It is now almost ten years since the first full-scale high-rate flooding attacks were 
unleashed on the Internet community [1]. The vector for those attacks was a set of 
compromised computer systems aka “zombies” that directed a high-volume stream of 
packets towards the target hosts. Ten years on, and notwithstanding their conceptual 
simplicity, high-rate flooding attacks (aka Distributed Denial of Service or DDoS 
attacks) using the same basic modus operandi still constitute an extremely pernicious 
threat within the Internet domain [2]. They also remain an unsolved problem. 
Consequently techniques and processes that detect and mitigate the impact of this 
form of attack continue to be an important and active area of research and 
development [3]. They also form the basis for a joint research project currently being 
undertaken under the auspices of the Australian and Indian Governments as part of 
the Australia-India Strategic Research Fund (AISRF). A key deliverable of this 
project is a DDoS Mitigation Module (DMM) i.e. a “network flooding attack 
mitigation tool” which integrates the detection and mitigation capability into a single 
device. 
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Two of the key challenges in implementing a workable solution to the DDoS problem 
are to operate the detection process at so-called “wire speed” i.e. speeds of at least 
10Gbps [2, 4] and be able to activate a response in real-time to mitigate the impact of 
the attack in order to protect some downstream target which may be an application 
server or security device or a complete subnet.  One important line of research is to 
utilize IP-address related features as the primary means of detecting an attack [5-10]. 
In this work we demonstrate how using packet source IP addresses coupled with a 
change-point analysis of the rate of arrival of new IP addresses may be sufficient to 
detect the onset of a high-rate flooding attack. Importantly, minimizing the number of 
features to be examined, directly addresses the issue of scalability of the detection 
process to higher network speeds. We also show how this information about 
potentially anomalous IP addresses could be used to modify a “white list” filter within 
a firewall dynamically as part of the mitigation strategy. We intend in future work to 
deploy and evaluate the approach with respect to protecting a security device, 
specifically an application firewall, ModSecurity.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous work 
on using features and characteristics of IP-addresses in detecting high-rate flooding 
attacks. Section 3 introduces the proposed DDoS Mitigation Module (DMM). It 
discusses the overall architecture of the DMM. Section 4 provides a detailed 
description of the NSP algorithm which classifies IP addresses based on their 
previous association with the host site and which is a core component in the DMM. 
Because performance of the NSP algorithm is crucial to its successful deployment 
actual operational networks, this section also shows a possible implementation based 
on a Bit-Vector approach. Section 5 shows the results of the experiments to test the 
“proof-of-concept” of the key ideas. Finally Section 6 summarizes the paper and 
outlines the future work. 
2. Related Work 
IP addresses play a pivotal role in identifying the communicating parties within the 
TCP/ IP suite of protocols. Consequently there is now a distinct body of knowledge 
surrounding the use of source IP address monitoring for detecting high-rate flooding 
attacks [6, 8-14] and in particular those in which the source IP-address had been 
“spoofed” [9]. Moreover such techniques are also capable of distinguishing 
anomalous network traffic (e.g. a DDoS attack) from a legitimate network event such 
as a so-called Flash Event [9, 11]. In addition IP address monitoring is able to detect 
attacks where each compromised host in the so-called “botnet herd” mimics the 
behavior of a legitimate user thereby making it difficult to distinguish between the 
normal network traffic and the attack traffic [3, 8, 10]. 
Central to any detection process is the requirement to identify a feature or set of 
features that appear more frequently in the target class but are less prominent in 
normal traffic and which capture the inherent features of an attack [3]. Also, in light 
of the adaptive behavior of the botnet masters, it is important to use features that are 
difficult or impossible for an attacker to change [3]. Over time various IP-address 
related features have been used in the detection process including basic features such 
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as the traffic volume per IP address [12]. Other features include the change in the 
number of network flows (i.e. distinct source/ destination IP address and port pairs) 
[11] as well as a change in the number of clients and in the pattern or distribution of 
clients across ISPs and networks [9]. The proportion of new source IP addresses seen 
by the target [3, 6, 8] have also been used along with features such as evidence of 
abrupt changes in traffic volume, flow dissymmetry as well as changes in the 
distribution of source IP addresses and the level of concentration of target IP 
addresses.  
Two key issues in effectively utilizing IP address information in the detection process 
are the impracticality of storing statistical data for each of the 232 elements in the IPv4 
address space and the need accommodate a sharp increase in the rate of arrival of new 
source IP addresses during a DDoS attack [3]. This necessitates minimizing the 
number of IP addresses being tracked and optimizing the way in which information 
about IP addresses is stored. For example Gil and Poletto [12] used a dynamic 4-level 
256-ary tree (MULTOPS) to collect traffic date for each IP address. However Peng et 
al. note that such a structure could itself succumb to a memory exhausting attack. 
Hence Peng et al. and Takada et al. [3, 6, 13] only store information on IP addresses 
that complete the TCP connect sequence correctly or send more than a threshold 
minimum number of packets. Peng et al. [8] also use a data structure comprising 210 
counters to (partially) aggregate the information about distinct IP addresses. Similarly 
Cheng et al. [10] isolate those IP addresses that are “new” and which are concentrated 
on a particular target IP address. Other authors have sought to exploit any inherent 
clustering of IP addresses. For example, Le [14] aggregated IP addresses using 
various subnet masks on the premise that in a Flash crowd most of the source IP 
addresses are close to each other whilst in a DDoS attack the sources are assumed to 
be more widely distributed. Finally, there is also a scalability issue for solutions in the 
IPv6 address space where the number of addresses is 2128. 
Once the feature vector has been created the remaining problem is to decide on a 
suitable algorithm that can use this information for detecting a DDoS attack. For 
example Cheng et al. [10] use a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier whilst 
Peng et al. [6] used the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm and a computation 
involving a simplified Mahalanobis distance [8] to detect any abrupt change in the 
fraction of new IP addresses (on the basis that an abrupt change of the proportion of 
new source IP addresses is a strong indication of a DDoS attack). Takada et al. [13] 
also used the CSUM algorithm whereas Le et al. [14] used filtering techniques from 
the area of signal processing. 
One of the earliest attempts at constructing a real-time adaptive system conceptually 
similar to the proposed DMM can be found in the work of Lee et al.[15-17]. Whilst 
their focus was on building an Intrusion Detection System, they demonstrated the 
importance of carefully segmenting and parallelizing the individual tasks to be 
performed in order to have a device that is capable of being scaled to operate in real-
time (or close to real-time) on high-speed, high-volume network traffic. They also 
addressed the problem of updating the device’s internal knowledge base once it has 
identified that a new attack has occurred. The basic idea used by Lee et al. is that of 
incremental learning i.e. adding to the existing knowledge base without having to 
completely retrain the underlying classifiers. Another example of previous work on 
adaptive IDS and one that appears to be more closely related to the objectives of this 
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project is that of the Cannady [18]. In particular Cannady examined the specific 
problem of adapting an IDS in dealing with DoS attacks. He also utilized feedback 
from the protected system in the form of system state variables such as CPU load, 
available memory, etc. 
More recent work on adaptive IDS can be found in Xu [19] and Moosa et al. [20] 
(who specifically focused on adaptive application aware firewalls). All extend the 
range of algorithms that could potentially be used as classifiers within the proposed 
DMM (e.g. Fuzzy Logic, Support Vector Machines, etc.). Notwithstanding the many 
variations on the theme, it would appear that the basic incremental learning 
architecture proposed by Lee et al. [15-17] together with the ideas of Cannady  [18] 
offer a good starting point for building the proposed DMM.  
3. Detection Architecture 
The design goal is for the DMM to have the capability to protect two “common 
monitoring environments” (i.e. security devices) viz. an application-aware firewall 
and a network-based intrusion detection system (IDS), from high-rate network 
flooding attacks. This includes protecting the devices under the so-called zero-day 
attack scenario i.e. a pattern of attack that has not previously appeared. Figure 1 
shows a schematic of a version of the proposed DMM that would operate in real-time 
but off-line with the task of protecting an application-aware firewall (or an Intrusion 
Prevention System).  
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of the proposed DMM protecting an application-aware firewall (or 
a Intrusion Prevention System).  
 
The key functions of the proposed DDoS Mitigation Module (DMM) are to detect the 
onset of a DDoS attack, use “state information” about the set of devices to be 
protected by the DMM to predict if any of them are at imminent risk of failing, and 
formulate and then direct a set of “control commands” to the devices “at risk” to 
enable them to manage (or “shape”) the network traffic situation (e.g. jettisoning 
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anomalous network packets). Since the intention is to develop a prototype DMM that 
can be deployed on existing networks, one of the initial design decisions is use COTS 
(Commercial off-the-shelf) offerings for components such as the designated 
“application-aware firewall” shown in Fig 1. As such, the designated “control 
commands” would then be rules expressed in the formats used internally in such 
devices. For example, one potential candidate “router/ firewall” device (at least for 
the purposes of the initial prototype) is a platform supporting the Open BSD Packet 
Filter (PF) [21]. (One of the key attractions of PF is that the filtering mechanism is 
externally configurable [22, 23].) In this case, the format of the designated “control 
commands” would be rules that conform to the PF syntax. Similarly the (Open Source 
Web) Application firewall ModSecurity [24, 25] is a potential candidate application 
firewall. (As with Packet Filter (PF) discussed above, ModSecurity has the underlying 
framework to deal with DoS attacks as well as an Automated Rule Update 
Capability.) As was the case with PF, the function of the DMM would be to generate 
rules in a format compatible with the ModSecurity rule set. A review of the literature 
highlights a degree of overlap between the core ideas of the proposed DMM and both 
current and previous work in constructing Intrusion Detection Systems that are 
adaptive (i.e. the ability to update the system rule set dynamically) and proactive (i.e. 
the ability to discern that an intrusion attack is in progress and react before it actually 
reaches its final stage) [26]. In fact, building an IDS with the capabilities to be 
adaptive and/ or proactive has been the subject of research in various guises for 
almost twenty years so there is a significant body of work from which it may be 
possible to draw a number of ideas as to how to approach the problem of building the 
required DMM. 
4. Detection Algorithm 
The basis of our algorithm is essentially that we expect to be able to detect whether 
currently incoming network traffic represents an attack on our system or not.  We 
represent the two system states: NA (not under attack) and A (under attack) 
respectively.  The algorithm is based on two top level functions, ipac and ddos. 
The ddos function (described below) analyses the rate of arrival of packets from 
previously unseen IP addresses and on that basis assigns the system state to A or NA.  
It is invoked at regular intervals, and based on the rate of arrival of packets from 
previously unseen IP addresses determines a state change form NA to A, or vice 
versa, from A to NA.  
The ipac address classification function examines the IP addresses of incoming 
network traffic.  It extracts the source IP address of each incoming packet and 
determines if the IP address is new or not seen previously - NSP.  To do so, ipac 
maintains two data structures which represent the IP addresses of incoming packets: 
W for ‘Whitelist’, and R for ‘Recent’. 
The data structure W is initialized with the source IP addresses of a known attack-free 
traffic sample, the data structure R is initialized to empty at system start-up.  The 
point of R is that as packets arrive from new IP addresses, we need to note those IP 
addresses in a temporary location – the structure R.  Only once the ddos function has 
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determined that the system is not under attack can those addresses be copied to the 
whitelist – the structure W.  This avoids polluting the whitelist W.  If on the other 
hand, the ddos function determines that the system is under attack, then R is 
discarded.  The system starts in state NA.   
The ipac(ip) function examines the source address ip of an incoming packet and if the 
IP address has not been seen previously, updates the structure R: 
 
if NOT ((ip IN W) OR (ip IN R)) then INC(newIP) 
add ip to R 
The ddos function is invoked at regular intervals, intervals of the order of 1 to 10 
seconds.  It has a simple purpose: it analyses the recent change in arrival rate of 
packets from NSP IP addresses.  It uses the function StateChange which in turn uses a 
cumulative sum algorithm (CUSUM) to detect abrupt changes in that rate of arrival 
and determines system state changes.  The ddos function does as follows: 
 
if (in state NA) then  
if NOT (StateChange(NA)) then  //no state change 
add R to W 
else      //state change to A 
state = A 
communicate W to the protected security 
device to use as a white list  
R= empty 
 
if ((in state A) then 
if (StateChange(A)) then   //state change to NA  
state = NA  
communicate to the protected security device to 
stop using the white list.   
 
There are also two obvious limitations in the above algorithm.  The first is that when 
the system is deemed to be under attack, that new IP addresses are treated as 
malicious – this can give rise to false positives.  Further work will extend the basis for 
rejection of packets beyond the simple property of NSP.  The further work will 
attempt to identify malicious traffic using other features also, to be used in tandem 
with NSP, features like subnet source addresses, IP distribution, traffic volume, traffic 
volume per IP address, etc.  The second limitation  concerns what to do about the 
interval of time during which ipac and ddos functions are executing.  We hope to 
keep these functions very small and efficient, so this may not be a problem.  It will 
however pose the problem of incoming packets not being properly processed if the 
functions are indeed too slow. We now discuss the implementation of the above NSP 
algorithm using bit vectors. 
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4.1. Bit Vector Implementation 
For IPv4,  a bit vector can be used for the implementation of W and R in the above 
algorithm.  Using a bit vector,  requires 0.5 GB to represent the 232 address space of 
IPv4.  (In contrast,   an IPv6 bit vector needs to represent 2128 addresses.  We are 
currently investigating the use of Bloom filters for IPv6).    
Implementation via bit vectors allows for a number of optimizations to the algorithm.  
The step ‘add R to W’ in the ddos function can be optimized by modifying the ipac 
function so that when setting the appropriate bit in R, it keeps a temporary copy of the 
ip value, or better still, a copy of the address of the bit being set. This optimization 
allows the ‘add R to W’ step to be implemented as a series of set bit operations rather 
than having to OR the entire bit vector R into W.  The second optimization relates to 
the step ‘R = empty’. This step is optimized in a similar fashion, by unsetting the 
relevant bits rather than zeroising the entire bit vector.   
4.2. Change Detection 
On the onset of  malicious activity, it is expected that the statistical properties of the 
traffic parameters no longer remain constant, resulting in an abrupt change. These 
change points can be detected using sequential analysis methods such as the 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) change point detection algorithm. CUSUM is a sequential 
analysis technique which assumes that the mean value of the (suitably transformed) 
parameter under observation will change from negative to positive in the event of a 
change in its statistical properties. Detecting this requires knowledge of the data 
distribution both before and after a malicious event.  
In real time network traffic analysis, estimating traffic distribution both before and 
after a malicious event is rather a difficult task if not impossible due to the lack of a 
complete model. In change detection, this problem can be solved using a non-
parametric CUSUM method as described by Blazek et al.[27]. In this paper we have 
adopted a non-parametric sliding window CUSUM change detection technique 
proposed by Ahmed et.al.  [28, 29]  for the analysis of source IP addresses. For the 
detailed description of the CUSUM technique, the interested readers are referred to 
[28, 29]. We use the CUSUM technique to detect changes in the number of new 
source IP addresses being observed in the network traffic during a measurement 
interval.  
5. Experimentation 
In order to establish the use of source IP address as a key feature to detect flooding 
attack, a comparative analysis of two different traffic traces has been conducted. In 
one analysis Peng et. al. [7] compared daily Auckland data trace [30] with the 
previous two week’s data traces to observe the persistence of the source IP addresses. 
We have carried out a similar analysis using network traffic collected from a 
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dedicated block of unused IP addresses (commonly known as a Darknet) and 
Auckland traffic trace has been carried out. In contrast to used address spaces where 
there are production hosts connected to the Internet, unused address spaces are 
routable Internet addresses which do not have any production host connected to 
Internet. Due to the absence of any production host the traffic observed on a darknet 
is by definition unsolicited and likely to be either opportunistic or malicious. Table 1 
provides the comparative analysis of the percentage of source IP addresses appearing 
in the fortnight previous to the listed dates for both Auckland and darknet network 
traffic traces. 
Table 1.  Persistance of source IP addresses.  
Auckland Trace Darknet Trace 
Date Percentage Date Percentage 
2001-Mar-26 88.7% 2009-Dec-25 1.25% 
2001-Mar-27 90.3% 2009-Dec-26 1.05% 
2001-Mar-28 89.1% 2009-Dec-27 1.03% 
2001-Mar-29 89.2% 2009-Dec-28 0.91% 
2001-Mar-30 90.2% 2009-Dec-29 0.94% 
2001-Mar-31 89.9% 2009-Dec-30 1.07% 
2001-Apr-01 88.1% 2009-Dec-31 7.99% 
 
From Table 1, it can be observed that high percentage of source IP addresses appear 
in the last fortnight in Auckland traffic, a normal behavior in network traffic. In 
contrast, very low percentages of source IP’s reappear during malicious network 
traffic such as the one collected from the darknet.  
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed NSP algorithm described in 
Section 4, the test bed shown in Figure 2 was being used.   
 
Victim
Normal Traffic (tcpreplay)Attack Traffic (fudp)
Switch
 
Fig. 2. The test bed architecture. 
 
The normal network trace used in the experiment is the a real network traffic taken 
from the University of Auckland [30]  known as Auckland VIII dataset. The IP 
addresses in the traffic trace have been mapped into 10.*.*.* using one to one hash 
mapping for privacy. The dataset is first analyzed to remove the SYN attacks which 
constitute the majority of the attacks [31]. In this regard TCP flows with less than 3 
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packets are treated as malicious packets and are being ignored. The cleaned data is 
then reproduced over the test bed using TCPREPLAY1 utility. The traffic is replayed 
at the rate of around 300 packets per seconds. For attack traffic, fudp2 utility was used 
to flood the victim machine with UDP packets with varying number of spoofed source 
IP addresses.  The average attack traffic rate is set to around 3000 packets per second 
(10 times the normal background traffic). Table 2 provides the statistics of the attack 
traffic being used in the experimentation. 








35 342141 134.38 1.01 
40 328579 129.35 1.01 
45 321433 129.29 1.01 
50 313747 123.23 1.01 
100 237831 93.49 1.01 
150 201020 86.83 1.01 
5.1. Performance Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, the UDP flooding 
attack with varying number of source IP addresses has been embedded in the network 
traffic. UDP flooding with constant packet rate and constant set of source IP 
addresses has been generated, see Table 2 for detail. Due to space limitations,  Figure 





                                                          
1
 TCPReplay web page, http://tcpreplay.synfin.net/ 
 
2
 Fudp download page, http://linux.softpedia.com/get/Security/fudp-35626.shtm 
 
Fig. 3. UDP flooding attack with 35 source IP addresses. 
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In Figure 3 the horizontal axis represents the observation period in 10 second bins, the 
left vertical axis represents total number of new source IP addresses in the 
measurement interval and the right axis represents the CUSUM decision function with 
1 being attack and 0 being no attack. The number of new source IP addresses in the 
10 second measurement interval is calculated using the proposed algorithm described 
in Section 4. The UDP flooding attack was started at measurement interval 260 and 
ended at 280 and is detected by the CUSUM technique. The large increase in the new 
IP addresses at the start in Figure 3 is due to the fact that the bit vector W is empty at 
the start of the analysis. The subsequent inclusion of the source IP addresses in the bit 
vector W results in the constant decrease of new IP address counter. The CUSUM 
change detection technique is not applied during the training period, which is up to 
measurement interval 230, which enables the sliding window to learn the normal 
network traffic behavior. A manual analysis of the generated white list was performed 
post attack to check for the presence of any attack sources in the list. No attacking 
source IP addresses were found in the white list (for all the UDP attacks). The 
detection delay is bound by the measurement interval which is selected as 10 seconds 
in this paper. All the attacks listed in Table 2 have been detected in less than 10 
seconds which can further be reduced using smaller measurement intervals.   
6. Conclusion and Future Directions 
In this paper, we have proposed a technique for detecting high rate flooding attacks. A 
proof of concept implementation of the proposed technique using bit vectors is 
provided in this paper. We have shown how a simple traffic feature such as source IP 
addresses can be used to effectively detect flooding attacks. 
Our ongoing work focuses on implementing the algorithm using bloom filter in order 
to compare the results with the bit vector implementation and to enable us to extend 
the approach to IPv6 with its much bigger IP address space. In addition we seek to 
investigate the performance of both bit vectors and bloom filters under high speed 
network flooding attack in both IPv4 and IPv6 networks. Moreover the analysis of 
algorithm under different and diverse flooding attacks needs to be investigated.  
We expect also in further work to extend the basis for rejection of packets beyond the 
simple property of IPs Not Seen Previously.  The further work will attempt to identify 
malicious traffic using other features also, to be used in tandem with NSP, features 
like subnet source addresses, IP distribution, traffic volume, traffic volume per IP 
address, packet inter-arrival time etc.   
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